GRAND STRATEGY_로비스트_군사대외정책. (Mr. Jung-Sun Kim) (12-13)



Military Strategist Mr. Jung-Sun Kim





Ⅰ. Introduction


Ⅱ. Analysis of The Northeast Asia Approach toward Korean Peninsula

1. Forecast of change in the US & Japansecurity system

2. The Evolution of US-China Security

3. Korea-China in a Changing Korean Peninsula Security

4. The Japanese Military Strategy & The Northeast Asia Multi-Cooperative Security


Ⅲ. Security Environment of Korean Peninsula

1. Korea's Security Strategy of Four Super Powers Surrounding Korean Peninsula

2. Comparative Military Relations of South &North Korea

3. Disarmament & Arms Control in TheKorean Peninsula


Ⅳ. Conclusion



3. Disarmament & Arms Control in The Korean Peninsula


Therefore this paper deals with a desirable approaching method of arms control in considering of the national situation, the mutual trust between North and South Korea and the optimal level of armament enough to meet future security needs of this peninsula.


Nowadays, the world enters into an economic competition after successful arms control among enemies or friendly nations. However, arms confrontation on the Korean peninsula continues. As a result of this, Korea suffering from a heavy loss in economic aspects. So it is very important to apply successful example of European, arms control to the Korean Peninsula.


Arms control intends to prevent a war though arms reduction, a prohibition of military build-up, and building mutual trust. Thus, arms control is a reasonable and realistic method that is to ensure not only security and safety between countries, but also to reduce the arms race through the reduction of the war possibility. Conventional arms control of in Europe stated with MBFR and Brezhnev's initiative, after withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces from Vietnam and Europe. It resulted in a failure because of a deep-rooted mutual distrust, and a lack of genuine political intention. CSCE however, results in a success with a compromise based on Gorbachev's new thinking, and peacemaking efforts by neutral nations in Europe of and France.


This process can be compared with the modern medicine where a doctor first of all attempts to relieve high fever from a patient before he figures out any causes of disease. Preceeded by political leaders decision, arms control, therefore, has to follow a sequence of tension reduction and arms reduction.


Arms reduction cannot create tension reduction. Therefore, if tension reduction is not achieved, arms reduction cannot be achieved either. Any arms reduction talks without reducing tension, as S. de Madariaga points out, will be an empty meeting like an animal arms reduction conference.

On the other hand, the Korean Peninsula that is entangled by interests of four powerful countries - The United States, Japan, China, and Russia - encounter a deadlock in arms control, because of deep-rooted antagonism and mutual distrust between South and North Korea. Analysis on South and North Korea's arms control proposals showed that North Korea insisted upon arms reduction with a view to communizing the entire Korean Peninsula by taking advantage of the withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces, while South Korea claimed the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula before any arms reduction. However, there has not been any real negotiations on arms control yet.


In the present situation, so as to bring about a success of arms control, appropriate proposal will include exchange of intelligence, and notification of military training in advance, etc. Also, the trends of these changes close the period which militarily powered nations controled the order of world, and warn us new orthodox which the economic power does on order. Besides, South Korea should show to North Korea strong political intention and determination for arms control so that : North Korea can overcome the antagonism and start arms control negotiations.


Now is called the age of economic warfare. In this time, if South and North Korea keep up arms race, they will be a defeated in economic warfare in the world.


This study aims at leading out the direction of reasonable arms control which offer the mutual system security and decrease of war threat in South and North Korea.


For the purpose of performing the study of arms control in Korean peninsula, I considered following points. First, I implemented realistic approach on the base of national profit and power relationship. Second, I treated the arms control on the base of military policy. Third, I used the process and result of European disarmament conference as a framework of this study. Last, I included security environment of Northeast Asian countries which have interests with Korean peninsula.


This Study gives some implications to military policy makers. The major ones are as following.


First, in order to build up the rational directions of the arms control, policy makers have to implement operational arms control without real arms reduction, and next structural arms control which is substantial arms reduction. Also, for the decrease of war threat they must try to bring up the economic deterrent.


Second, they must adopt the method of conference on the base of rationalization.


Third, the method of arms control in Korean peninsula is mainly to be applied to conventional weapons.


Fourth, in a long term, the foundation of the special institutions and specialized expert education is needed so as to establish the consistent arms control policy.


Fifth, the external conditions in Korean peninsula is made up of for confidence building of South and North Korea because the development and the performance of arms control cannot succeed if the military powered nations in this region don't support.


 Last, policy makers must get over the internal separate structure in Korea.


The will of arms control bust be started from the one of overcoming this structure.